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KINDER MORGAN: WHEN MANAGEMENT CONCEALS
A BUYOUT FROM THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
JonathanTiegerman*
Chief management officials at Kinder Morgan, Inc. considered the
prospect of a leveraged buyout for months before letting the oil-and-gas
pipeline company's Board of Directors in on the deal.' The actions of
management, keeping the Board in the dark about the developing private equity
buyout, which marks one of the largest of its kind ($14.8 billion), illustrates the
divergent interests of top management and directorial boards in today's public
companies.
The wedge driven between a company's Board of Directors and its
managerial foremen, often in the form of handsome compensation packages
promised to management by private equity buyers, highlights an old concern for
public investors but with a new twist: In private equity deals, investment banks
are now seeking to concurrently don multiple hats as both advisor to the target
company and as investor in the target. This is precisely the scenario that has
unwound in the Kinder Morgan buyout whereby Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
initially acting as financial advisor to Kinder Morgan
later became a principal
2
investor in the public-to-private buyout of its client.
The story begins in February of 2006 when Kinder Morgan president
C. Park Shaper enlisted Goldman Sachs to propose strategies in order to
augment the gas-and-oil pipeline company's shareholder value. The alternative
of a leveraged buyout was not suggested until March. In April, president
Shaper was joined by Rich Kinder, founder of Kinder Morgan and 18% owner
of the company at the time, who was to lead a potential buyout group. The
private equity arm of the world's foremost investment bank, Goldman Sachs
Capital Partners had negotiated a not-so-shabby arrangement with the Kinder
Morgan management buyout group to serve as the leveraged buyout's principal
investor.
In the subsequent months, the terms of the buyout were negotiated
(although negotiations imply a degree of contentiousness which I surmise was
lacking here) with Goldman Sachs Group on one side of the negotiation table

*Attorney at Law, Hofstra School of Law and Frank Zarb School of Business
See Berman, Dennis and Henny Sender, In Kinder LBO, Board Was Left in Dark For Over 2
Months as DealPercolated,WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 29 2006 at C1.
2 See id.
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advocating the interests of Kinder Morgan shareholders opposite Goldman
Sachs Capital Partners, representing the investment bank's proprietary interests.
News of these ongoing developments did not reach Kinder Morgan's Board
until May 13. Already in place at that time were the armies of lawyers, from
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, hired to
advise the management buyout group in the public-to-private transaction.
REVLON: DUTY To AUCTION THE CONCERN To THE HIGHEST
BIDDER
In this situation, the Board and management possess conflicting
interests. Consequently, the amount of time the Board is given before
shareholders vote on the buyout may significantly weigh upon the success of
the buyer's bid. The Board of Directors, upon learning of the potential sale of
the company, will attempt to control the process and the terms of the sale in a
manner most favorable to the company's shareholders. This reflects the edict
handed down by the Revlon case adjudicated during the leveraged buyout boom
of the 1980s.4 In Revlon, the court opined that the directors' fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder profits could only be accomplished by obtaining the
highest price for the benefit of the stockholders.5
Application of a Revlon duty depends upon the effect the corporate
combination will have on stockholders' meaningful participation in corporate
governance. 6 Thus, the demarcation between Revlon and non-Revlon deals
hinges upon a change of corporate control. 7 If there is a change in corporate
control, as in a leveraged buyout, wherein shareholders will no longer
participate in corporate governance because they are "cashed out", a Revlon
duty is triggered. This is in contrast to a stock-for-stock merger, for instance,
wherein shareholders will retain their voting rights via newly issued stock in the
surviving company: this transaction is entitled to business judgment deference.8
This result is equitable since the shareholder who receives stock in the surviving
corporation has preserved her right to enjoy the future maximization of wealth
and has presumably lost nothing.
The significance of a change in corporate control is deserving of a
Revlon duty to protect shareholder interests: "there are few events that have a

a See id.
4 See Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
5 Id; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom
6 See ALLEN, WILLIAM T. & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 540 (Aspen Publishers 2003).
7 Id.
8 See In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. ShareholderLitigation,669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
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more significant impact on the stockholders than a sale of control or a corporate
break-up. Each event represents a fundamental (and perhaps irrevocable)
change in the nature of the corporate enterprise." 9 Revlon reaches a logical
result since a holder of equity who is pushed out of the company is denied
participation in the future profits of the company. That shareholder has a
compelling right to enjoy a maximization of profits today since there is no pot
of gold at the end of the rainbow.'
Faced with a buyout which would effectuate an immediate divestiture
of the shareholders' present and future interests in Kinder Morgan, Inc., the
Board of Directors owed a Revlon fiduciary duty to put the company up for
auction in order to fulfill its obligation to shareholders to obtain the richest
purchase price. The competing financial interests of the management buyout
group to see the private equity bid succeed were furthered by CEO Rich
Kinder's evasive tactics. As aforementioned, the Board of Directors only
became aware of Goldman's buyout proposal two months after the advisory
firm initiated discussion of the transaction due to management's careful
concealment of the matter. Mr. Kinder and his constituents appeared to
entrench the company from competing offers agreeing, at the behest of
Goldman's private equity arm, not to negotiate competing bids with third
parties for 90 days." Such maneuvers suggest that the rights of Kinder Morgan
shareholders to enjoy a present maximization of wealth may have been
pretermitted.
THE ROLE OF THE BANKER
Investment banks are generally responsible for pricing and structuring
transactions that satisfy the needs of market participants. By distributing
products and making markets, investment banks provide a forum for buying and
selling in the context of business combinations (M&A) and underwriting
(capital formation). More simply, investment banks lead clients who are mired
in some quandary to firmer ground by advising clients on creating frameworks
for internal capabilities and proposing external opportunities. Financial advice
may take the form of negotiating the terms of a deal, analyzing financial,
commercial operational, and strategic assumptions of a business, rendering
valuation assessments of a business combination's price risk, implementing a
stock price performance analysis, a discounted cash flow analysis of a target

9 See ParamountCommunications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
I See supra note 6 (explaining that "public shareholders cannot participate in the long-term
strategic value of the [merger].")
11 See Berman, Dennis and Henny Sender, In Kinder LBO, Board Was Left in Dark For Over 2
Months as Deal Percolated,WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 29 2006 at C1.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

3

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS & LAW

company's earnings and estimated future earnings, or various other services.
The horizontal design of investment banks and pedigree personnel
provide the heavy firepower that clients desire in devising and executing
business strategies in short periods of time. Because of the technical nature and
exclusivity of the complex solutions engineered by investment bankers, a kind
of trustee-client relationship naturally follows.
Of considerable controversy are the fairness opinions issued by
investment banking institutions. The opinion is supposed to provide assurance
that a deal is fair from a financial standpoint. Because the fairness opinion
insulates a company's officers and directorial Board from legal liability to
company shareholders' 12, companies are willing to pay hefty sums for this flimsy
document.13 Moreover, the subjective nature of the determination that a deal is
fair makes the opinion nearly immune from challenge and of minimal value to
shareholders in deciding whether to support or vote against a deal.
CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS: BANKERS CAN Do WHAT LAWYERS
CANNOT
The relationship existing between investment bankers and their clients
during the rendition of advisory services is not substantially unlike the attorneyclient relationship. From the perspective of the client, the advisor (whether a
law firm or an investment bank) is expected to remain loyal to the client's
interests for which the advisor has been employed. On the basis of this
expectation of loyalty, investment bankers will be privy to confidences and
secrets that the client would not otherwise reveal. Thus, analyzing the potential
conflicts of interest that may eventuate in the analogous attorney-client
relationship, according to the ethical boundaries of legal standards, may provide
some insight into the potential means by which banker-client conflicts should be
addressed.
The "conflicts of interest" issue is one that lawyers have struggled with
for many years in determining when an attorney is not fit to represent a client
because of a conflict of interest. The conflict of interest embodies the age-old
premise that "no man can serve two masters."' 1 4 As admitted by Roy Simon,
preeminent professor in the field of lawyers' ethics, conflicts of interests remain
thorny matters to evaluate because of the corresponding "complexities of even

12 See e.g. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 517 A.2d 653 (Del. 1986).

13 See e.g. Daimler-Chrysler Merger Agreement (substantiating the $55 million that the Chrysler
Board paid Credit Suisse First Boston for its opinion that the terms of the merger of equals with
Daimler Benz were fair.).
14Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS
h

AND MATERIALS at 174 (8" ed. 2003)(quoting Matthew 6:24).
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garden variety conflicts questions.
The analysis begins with a discussion of
concurrent conflicts. Under the New York Code of Professional Responsibility
and the equivalent ABA Model Rule, a lawyer is prohibited from accepting or
continuing representation of a client where doing so would be directly adverse
to the interests of another client; i.e. advocating the interests of one client
directly harms the interests of another current client. This was the holding of
the Second Circuit 6, thereafter enacted in the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility (DR § 5-105(a)):
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise
of independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will
be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of
the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve
the lawyer in representing differing interests, except
to the
17
extent permitted under subdivision (c) of this section.
Subsection (c) elaborates on the former providing that independent
professional judgment is not deemed to be adversely affected "if a disinterested
lawyer would believe that the lawyer can competently represent the interest of
each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
implications of the simultaneous representation and the advantages and risks
involved."' 8 Therefore, notwithstanding a concurrent conflict, a lawyer may
accept or continue representation of directly adverse clients if each client gives
informed consent (preferably confirmed in writing) and if the lawyer meets the
"disinterested lawyer" standard defined in DR § 5-105(c). This standard is an
objective one: if Jiminy Cricket believes the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent legal representation, then the attorney's independent
professional judgment is deemed in tact and the representation is free to
commence or continue.
Another kind of conflict involves the situation where the lawyer

15Roy D. Simon, Final Conflicts Exam: There's a Will, but Is There a Way? THE NEW YORK
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, Jul. 2006, at 1.
16 Cinema 5 v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
17Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards, NEW YORK
DISCIPLINARY RULE § 5-105 (2006); see also e.g. NY DR § 5-101 (2004)(stating that "a lawyer
shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the
client will be or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own financial, business, property or
personal interests, unless a disinterested lawyer would believe that the representation of the client
will not be adversely affected thereby and the client consents to the representation after full
disclosure of the implications of the lawyer's interest.").
'" NY DR § 5-105(c) (2006).
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obtains a financial interest that is potentially adverse to the interests of his/her
client. Ethical Consideration 5-4 of the New York Code of Professional
Responsibility illustrates the drafters' concerns in one instance where during the
course of an attorney-client representation, a client under criminal prosecution
agrees in place of a fee (either in whole or in part) to grant the lawyer a
beneficial ownership in literary rights relating to the subject matter of the legal
representation. Here, there is a risk that the lawyer "may be tempted to
subordinate the interests of the client to the lawyer's own anticipated gain. For
example, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from the client television...
rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously,
to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of the [television] right to the
prejudice of the client."' 9 This conflict can also be cured by informed consent
so long as the attorney's independent professional judgment is uncompromised.
Several policy arguments underlie the legal profession's cynicism
toward legal practitioners engaging in representations, which pose potentially
significant risks of concurrent conflicts. Specific to lawyers alone, the attorney
client relationship binds the attorney with a duty of confidentiality. 20 Hence,
there is concern where a concurrent conflict exists, an attorney possessing
confidential information about Client A in an earlier or present matter would be
tempted to use such confidential information when later representing Client B
against Client A to the disadvantage of Client A.
The other policy reason against concurrent conflict representations
stems from the client's expectation of loyalty from his trusted advisor. The
sacrament that is the expectation of loyalty was best illustrated by a Connecticut
state court:
When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given
piece of business he is entitled to feel that, until that business
is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided
loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate and
his champion. If as in this case, he is sued and his home
attached by his own attorney who is representing him in
another matter, all feeling of loyalty is necessarily destroyed,
and the profession
is exposed to the charge that it is interested
2
only in money. 1

'9 Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards, NEW YORK
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY RULE § 5-101 (2004).
20 See NY DR § 4-101 (2006).
2'Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964).
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While this duty is legally binding betwixt lawyers and their clients, the
expectation of loyalty is not exclusive to the legal profession. The legal seal
stamped upon the attorney-client relationship is largely a consequence of the
sacred regard with which we behold the relationship due to its historical
significance and longevity in Western society. Our protection of the former
relationship is also the result of longstanding concern that the erosion of the
attorney-client relationship, and consequently the fiduciary's violation of this
confidence, poses catastrophic damages to the client's interests.
Substituting a single law firm for Goldman Sachs in the Kinder
Morgan scenario and applying the aforementioned ethical standards, we reach
the undeniable conclusion that concurrent representation of both the leverage
buyout group (headed by CEO Rich Kinder) and Kinder Morgan, Inc. in this
public-to-private transaction would certainly lie outside the realm of ethical
standards maintained by any of the 50 States. 22
SARBANES OXLEY, ENRON, AND THE VOID LEFT FOR SELFDEALING IN PRIVATE EQUITY BUYOUTS
The scandalous accounting practices that unwound beginning with the
fall of Enron embodied the many shortcomings of the safeguards that were put
in place to prevent the cloth from being pulled over the eyes of corporate
shareholders, regulators, the media, and the investing public. 3 Many were to
blame: Arthur Andersen, Enron, the investment banks, the convoluted network
of partnerships through which Enron masked its true colors, etc. . . The writing
was on the wall: "'[olne can violate the SEC laws and still comply with'
generally accepted accounting principles. 24 The sacrificial lambs remained the
lowly public, standing on the outside and bearing the expense of wrongdoing by
corporate insiders. In the 2000 fiscal year, shareholders who had invested in
companies which restated their earnings suffered losses of $31.2 billion. 5

22

See e.g. ABA MODEL RULE § 1.10(a) (2006)(prohibiting two lawyers, in the same law firm,

from representing directly adverse parties in the same matter. Rules of imputation therefore treat a
law firm as one lawyer.); see also RESTATEMENT THIRD, THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 122(2); see also ABA MODEL RULE 1.7(b) (2006)(prohibiting the representation of
two clients in the same litigation where one client will assert a claim against the other.).
23See Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned From Enron's Fall, United States Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 107'h Cong. (Feb. 6, 2002) (Statement of Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law,
Boston University School of Law).
24Steve Liesman, SEC's Accounting Cop Warns Firms: Playing by Rules May Not Be Enough,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 12, 2002 (statement of Charles Niemeier, Chief Accountant
for the Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Division.).
25David Wessel, When Standards Are Unacceptable, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 7,
2002.
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Enron Chief Financial Officer, Andy Fastow, demonstrated the
potential damage that can be done to shareholder value as a result of insider
wrongdoing, specifically executive self-dealing. The convoluted network of
Enron partnerships was instrumental in the energy giant's concealment and
perpetuation of corporate frauds. The partnerships purchased and sold assets to
Enron of an estimated value in the hundreds of millions of dollars.26 In some
cases, in order to meet earnings expectations, "these executive-run partnerships
were used to keep debt and losing ventures off Enron's books." 2 In another
instance, partnership LJM2 renegotiated a deal that saved it millions of dollars
at the expense of parent company Enron.28 These transactions beg the question,
where do management's loyalties lie? Were the executives of this company
seeking to maximize the wealth of the firm and derivatively the shareholders of
the firm to whom they owed a duty of loyalty? Or, rather were the terms of
negotiation with parent company Enron intended to maximize the wealth of the
partnership in which the executives held a proprietary interest?
Consequently, the billions in losses shouldered by public voters
marked one of the rare instances where partisans stood on the same side of an
issue. Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes and Republican Representative
Michael Oxley bore the sweeping legislation aimed at prosecuting the
fraudulent accounting practices that infected what had previously been deemed
the model firms of Corporate America. Among other things, the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002 set higher procedural standards for the auditors of public
companies. SOX regulations blew the doors off of corporate compliance
requirements in place at the turn of the century.
A law's effectiveness in deterring future corporate wrongdoing in
response to prominent scandal of the recent past necessarily hinges upon
legislators' skillful definition of the underlying problem in the present.
Characterizing the shortcomings of regulations appurtenant to the enactment of
Sarbanes Oxley in 2002, the independence of executives in the context of dealmaking remains a sparsely regulated matter as implicated by federal law.
Where private equity funds express interest in a target company for a buyout,
corporate executives are crucial players in advising their constituents and
shareholders in the public-to-private transaction. Yet, their fiduciary role in
maximizing shareholder wealth appears to be under attack by private equity
firms showering the executives with promises of stock options, bonuses, and
golden parachutes upon the consummation of the leveraged buyout. Such

26 See John R. Emshwiller and Rebecca Smith, Murky Waters: A Primer On the Enron

Partnerships,THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 21, 2002.
27 id.
2

See id.
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incentives weaken the expectation that executives and managers will be able to
render objective advice (with absolute loyalty) in the best interests of
shareholders when management stands to benefit so handsomely from the
public-to-private bid. The extravagant riches promised to executives are
exemplified by the purchase of German chemical company, Celanese, by
private equity concern Blackstone Group. 29 Blackstone, in December 2003,
paid a 13% premium above market capitalization for a total deal value of $4
billion.30 For its success in buying out the German concern, and a subsequent
initial public offering, the private equity group rewarded Celanese's executives
with a $13 million bonus to be split up among them. 3' Options on 7.8 million
shares of common stock were granted to the executives with an additional 1.6
million shares offered at a steeply discounted price.32 At the end of the
rainbow, Celanese executives ultimately shared a pot of gold valued at greater
than $65 million.33
The duty of loyalty (by legal standards) requires that corporate officers
exercise institutional power over corporate process in a good faith-effort to
advance the interests of the company. Executives, when transacting with the
corporation, have a duty to fully disclose all material facts to the corporation's
disinterested representatives and to deal with the corporation on terms that are
intrinsically fair. Officers of the corporation cannot deal with the corporation in
any way that benefits them at the corporation's expense. The fiduciary duty
owed by corporate management and directorial boards has been held by Courts
to extend far beyond the more blatant instances of executive disloyalty. In
Dodge v. Ford Motor34 , Ford Motor Company's operations had sustained an
extended period of profitability. With these profits, CEO Henry Ford decided
to raise employee wages, reinvest in the company, and cut prices to consumers.
Shareholders brought suit in Delaware courts. The Delaware Court presiding
opined that Ford Motor Company had a duty to pay dividends to its
shareholders, who behold a primacy interest in the company. While the
outcome of this case would fall presently under business judgment deference,
Delaware continues to hold that the duty of loyalty is owed strictly to
shareholders.
29

See John Christy, et al., On Going Private:Investors Beware, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,

Nov. 18, 2006.
30 See id.
3' See id.
32 See id.

3 See id.
34 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)(quoting Dodge v. FordMotor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 50609 (1919)(Henry Ford's philanthropic motives did not permit him to set Ford Motor Company
dividend policies to benefit public at expense of shareholders.)).
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If the duty of loyalty owed solely to the corporation's shareholders
proscribed (under certain circumstances) a company from paying increased
wages to workers, lowering prices to customers, and plowing back earnings into
the going concern prior to distributing dividends to shareholders, how can this
duty be deemed sufficed when corporate officers welcome the same bankers
who are advising the company in the sale of itself to be the primary purchasers
of the company thereby ensuring that the going concern will not be sold for the
highest possible price? After all, a purchaser wouldn't spend $18 billion on an
asset unless it believed it stood to earn substantial returns on its investment
which were not accounted for in the purchase price (otherwise, it would realize
no gain on the purchase).
Similarly, how can the independence of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. be
found unquestionably in tact in advising Kinder Morgan with the objective of
obtaining the optimal price for Kinder's shareholders in the sale of the company
when the advisory branch's coworkers and compatriots in Goldman Sachs
Capital are sitting across the table bargaining for the cheapest purchase price it
can negotiate?
Furthermore, what assurances do a target company's
shareholders have that the investment bank advising the target in a leveraged
buyout won't hold back or pull its punches at the negotiating table when the
bank is also acting as a principal investor in the purchase of the target?
Investment banks risk only their reputations in rendering quality services to
their clients; banks are not bound by a legal duty short of a general obligation
not to defraud their clients. When comparing the loyalty a client expects from
his/her banking advisor versus the legally binding duties owed by lawyer-toclient and corporate officer-to-shareholder, bankers seem to have little to fear in
the way of legal consequence or discipline. Law firms on the other hand appear
to be looking down the barrel of a loaded gun: the firm's license to practice law
is at stake, the State Bar is vested with the authority to slap lawyers with heavy
disciplinary fines, and the firm risks substantial monetary damages for
malpractice lawsuits should the firm breach ethical standards by accepting or
continuing representation involving an unwaived or unconsentable conflict of
interest. Nor do corporate officers have it as easy as bankers: management and
board members may be held personally liable for breaches of their fiduciary
duties through shareholders' derivative lawsuits.
Investment bankers are free to engage in ethically compromised
conduct because the business practice operates without the constraints of a
binding code of conduct. Consider the recent adjudication of four Merrill
Lynch bankers in the notorious "barge deal." This deal involved an equity
interest in several power-generating barges on the coast of Africa. The four
bankers agreed that its employer Merrill Lynch would purchase and retain the
equity interest from Enron for a six month period after which Enron executives

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol6/iss1/5
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(including Andy Fastow) promised the energy giant or one of its affiliates
would buyback the equity interest. To Enron, temporarily removing the asset
from its book for the purpose of reporting year end earnings and meeting
analyst forecasts was worth a flat fee of $250,000 and a guaranteed 15% annual
rate of return over the six-month period that Merrill retained its equity interest
in the barges. 35 The deal allowed Enron to record an additional $12 million in
earnings thereby defrauding public investors as to the true state of the company.
For allowing Enron to park its assets on Merrill Lynch's books, the investment
bank earned $775,000 on the barge deal. Prosecutors averred, rightfully so, that
the transaction was a lease in substance and therefore Merrill bankers and Enron
officials had conspired to defraud Enron and its shareholders.
The Merrill four were initially convicted by the trial court. The
conviction was reversed on the appellate level. According to Dr. Barbara
Jennings, the appellate court sympathized with the bankers' Nuremberg
defense: "Fraud requires proof of intent to defraud someone, and where a
company is so fraught with fraud that fraud becomes its business those on the
outside doing transactions cannot be expected to ferret through the smoke
screens. Such a requirement would set a dangerous legal precedent with its
imposition of duties on bankers. 36 From this outcome, what dangerous legal
precedent have we avoided now that the letter of the law condones bankers to
aid and abet fraud so long as this is the wish of the client? This result enables
the moral turpitude of financial advisors despite the so called reputational risks
faced by investment bankers. No doubt finance professionals will weigh the
benefits of aiding client fraud against reputational risk and choose the more
lucrative of the two. And since courts refuse to attach penalties to the unethical
practices of investment bankers, the scale seems heavily tipped in favor of the
economic benefits to stem from abetting client manipulations and wrongdoings.
Certainly, the system would be better off if advisor (i.e. Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc.), upon perceiving unrealized profit potential bound up within
its client, was legally compelled to advise its client on actualize such profits and
legally prohibited from reaping such gains for itself (i.e. Goldman's private
equity arm) at a bargain price. There can be no doubt that Kinder management
has enabled its future employer and owner (Goldman Sachs Capital Partners) to
deal with the corporation in a way that benefits the buyers at the corporation's
expense. "[T]hese arrangements present the possibility for conflicts of interest,
as clients become wary that the strategic advice is tilted in a way that favors the

35 See Dr. Barbara Jennings, Ethics in Finance, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 06,

2006.
id.

36
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adviser's own investing role. 37
A less than zealous effort on the part of the advisory firm to represent
the interests of the shareholders in the sale of the target company engenders a
resulting sale that falls short of satisfying the company's Revlon duty. The
essence of an auction is that the highest bidder wins the bidding. It is difficult
to imagine that the company has really been sold for the highest price it would
otherwise have been purchased for where the investment bank plays the part of
both auctioneer and bidder while locking competitive bidders out of the auction
hall. The result is that the shareholders of Kinder Morgan have sold their
securitized right to participate in corporate governance and the future profits of
company at a discounted price.
The new regulations under Sarbanes Oxley serve as a solution to a
specific problem: material misrepresentations and fraud in public companies'
accounting statements filed with the S.E.C. The 2002 legislation fell short of
regulating management's self dealing in private equity buyouts despite reports
that Andy Fastow, for his self dealing, defrauded Enron shareholders to the tune
of $30 million. 38 This is likely the case since regulations sought to deter frauds
committed primarily in the accounting statements of public companies, which is
outside the scope of mergers and acquisitions. Additionally, fraud-doers may
be subject to criminal prosecution in contrast to the less reprehensible civil
offence of self-dealing; arguably, the magnitude of the monetary loss suffered
by Kinder Morgan's shareholders cashed out at a discounted price is greater
than some of the losses induced by the corporate frauds that Sarbanes Oxley
was purported to address. Shareholders remain exposed in private equity
transactions to the conflicting financial interests of management and the
proprietary interests of the corporation's bankers.
RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS
In order to protect the shareholder from the conflicts of interest born
by managerial officials and investment bankers, a number of resolutions should
be considered. Centralizing authority in a regulatory body with a heightened
purpose toward overseeing the conduct of investment advisors and corporate
executives in private equity deals is a first step. Public investors are illequipped to monitor the conduct of corporate insiders and their bankers. This is
especially the case where, as in the current predicament, even the Board of
Directors is kept in the dark as to management's clandestine plotting to ensure a

37 Berman, Dennis and Henny Sender, In Kinder LBO, Board Was Left in Dark For Over 2 Months

as Deal Percolated,WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 29 2006 at C1.
38 See Diana B. Henriques, Even a Watchdog Not Always Fully Awake, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2002.
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successful buyout. The government must expand its role as advocate for the
lowly shareholder whose final opportunity to enjoy a wealth maximization
event is outmatched by the power and influence of corporate officers to
manipulate the terms of the prospective sale.
Another strategy to deter management's subordination of shareholder
interests in favor of personal gain would be legislation vesting in shareholders
and corporations a cause of action to sue the corporation's officers. Currently,
certain kinds of expropriation by corporate officials do not rise to the threshold
of illegality. Legal reforms would go a long way to protecting minority
shareholders from corporate insiders by discouraging the self-dealing of
management which accentuates the conflict of interest. In doing so, the U.S.
stock market as a whole would appreciate in value 39 - "[w]here laws are
protective of outside investors and well enforced, investors are willing to
40
finance firms, and financial markets are both broader and more valuable.,
This hypothesis was substantiated by the findings of a recent study. As a
significant component of the study, academic scholars and financial theorists
analyzed how firms' valuations were related to the legal protections afforded to
minority shareholders by the respective countries in which the firms engaged in
regular business. 41 Data was compiled by sampling 539 large firms from 27
international economies of wealth. The researchers closely monitored the
relationship between investor protection and corporate valuation throughout the
27 countries. The findings were conclusive:
When [shareholders'] rights are better protected by the law,
outside investors are willing to pay more for financial assets
such as equity and debt. They pay more because they
recognize that, with better legal protection, more of the firm's
profits would come back to them as interest or dividends as
opposed to being expropriated by the entrepreneur who
controls the firm. By limiting expropriation, the law raises
the price that securities fetch in the marketplace. In turn, this
enables more entrepreneurs to finance their investments

39 See e.g. Claessens, Stijn et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large
Shareholdings, 57 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2741-2770 (Dec. 2002); see also La Porta, Rafael et
al., Corporate Ownershiparoundthe World, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 471-517 (Apr., 1999).
40 La Porta, Rafael et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 JOURNAL OF
FINANCE 1147 (Jun., 2002).
41 La Porta, Rafael et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 JOURNAL OF
FINANCE 1147-1169 (Jun., 2002).
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externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets.42
Vis-t-vis strong evidentiary support that poor legal protection of
shareholders diminishes firm value and derivatively lowers the values of a
nation's debt and equity markets, there is strong economic incentive to impress
more pronounced legal protections. In a related study of the consequences of
entrenched controlling shareholders on firm valuation, a consistent conclusion
was reached.43 The authors of the study found a significant propensity for large
investors to represent their personal proprietary interests which were often at
odds with the interests of the firm and its investors. 44 A further revelation was
an "inverse U-shaped relationship between managerial equity ownership and
firm valuation for a sample of U.S. firms, 45 confirming the notion that firm
value is negatively effected by the entrenchment of managements and
controlling shareholders. Responding to the leveraged buyout boom of the
1980s, Shleifer and Vishny were interested in qualifying and quantifying the
costs to a target corporation of entrenched manager ownership in blocking
value-enhancing turnovers. Somewhat ironically, the findings of Shleifer and
Vishny appear equally applicable to the situation where management attempts
to expropriate or diminish shareholder wealth by facilitating a buyout while
minimizing the number of competing bidders participating in the purchase of
the company. The buyout firm has conceivably saved hundreds of millions of
dollars by paying a sliver of its cost savings over to management in the way of
weighty golden parachutes in exchange for management's complicity, shutting
the auction house doors closed in order to exclude competing bidders. In both
the entrenched controlling shareholder scenario and the situation involving
managerial efforts to entrench a buyout bid, the risk is the same - the risk of
expropriation by an authority bearing substantial control over corporate affairs.
Increased legal protection for minority shareholders could be achieved by
enacting a statutory right of shareholders to force the corporation to sue itself
for managerial expropriation. This would relieve some of the conflicting
interests between management and investors in the course of a buyout, as well
as furnish the United States' securities markets with economic enrichment.
Finally, the fairness opinion is far from an affirmation that shareholder

42

Id. at 1147.

43 Claessens, Stijn et al.,

Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large
Shareholdings,57 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2742 (Dec. 2002).
44 Id. (quoting Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 57
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 758 (1997).).
45 Id. (citing Morck, Randall, Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and
Market Valuation: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 20 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 293-315

(1988).).
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wealth has been maximized via the private equity buyout (especially when the
advisors are regularly stamping each others' deals as fair and will thus be weary
of declining another bank's deal with the possible consequence of a backlash in
obtaining fairness opinions for its own deals and the forbearance of hefty
revenues 46). Additionally, the conflicting interests of management in leveraged
buyouts are inadequately addressed by fiduciary duties imposed by corporate
governance laws. Rather than waiting for a bright line case to reach the courts
(i.e. a private equity firm enlisting management in facilitating the purchase of a
controlling equity interest in a company for peanuts), shareholder losses and
litigation expenditures could be avoided by imposing "disinterested banker" and
"disinterested executive" standards similar to that used by lawyers' ethics
oversight bodies in regulating the representations of conflicted lawyers. By
analogizing to the objective standard requiring lawyers to maintain independent
professional judgment in representing clients' interests 47, a disinterested banker
standard would condemn unethical relationships wherein banking advisors
might be tempted to subordinate the interests of clients to the banker's own
anticipated gain. It does not take a lawyer to perceive the risk of economic
immorality posed by sell-side bankers taking money out of the pockets of
shareholders and placing it directly into the pockets of the bankers' buy-side
coworkers. Centralizing authority in an oversight committee empowered to
regulate the dealings of investment bankers and private equity funds in ethically
questionable dealings protects the unsophisticated investor from self-dealing by
corporate insiders and conflicted advisors. As for management, where a
potential conflict exists, imposing upon corporate officials a disclose-or-abstain
requirement might remedy some of the conflicts that are likely to arise in the
context of a buyout. Executives, during a buyout, would owe a legal duty to
timely report any personal knowledge of any offer to buyout the company with
a failure to do so creating the possibility of legal liability. Alternatively, the
executive would be legally obligated to abstain from any preliminary
negotiations with outside bidders. This prescription would certainly prevent
any further instances of clandestine scheming on the part of overzealous
managerial officials.

46

See supra note 13 (Chrysler's Board paid $55 million for a fairness opinion as to its combination

with Daimler Benz.).
47 See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards, NEW
YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ETHICAL CONSIDERATION § 5-4

(2004).
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